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Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co.
The Ca.fnference sought the views of the SG, who
takes something of a wishy-washy position,

The

position seems to be that the company is relying somehow
on the practice of the United States government not

\

to hire aliens, a practice which may be affected by
this Court's decision in Sugarman,

Presumably, the

argument continues, if the United States abandons
this practice, the company may abandon it, thereby
obviating the need to pass on the question whether
the statute authorizes the EEOC guideline,

My

recommendation is that you hold this case for
Sugarman and take a second look then.
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1. Petr was refused employment by resp because she
. 1/

~

/,,J\)j'\S~

is not a United States

citize~.

She brought a civil

action after complaining to the Equgl Opportunity

~V (.J7 Commission and receiving a "Notice of Right to Sue. ••
i~~ J\ The USDC W.D. Texas (Suttle) upheld her claim under
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42

u.s.c.

§

2000e-2(a)(l), finding that discrimination

on the basis of citizenship was encompassed within the
prohibition on discrimination on the
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CA 5 reversed.

Petr claims that discrimination

against legally resident aliens is prohibited by 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a).
2. a. Factss Petr was denied employment by resp under
a long-standing policy that only United States citizens
would be hired.

-

Resp, all agree, does not discriminate

against anyone on the basis of national origin.
~

Petr is

twa£,_,

of Mexican origin, and 92% of resp's total employees are
Mexican origin.

Resp's policy against hiring noncitizens

is not related to any work requiring government security
clearances.
citizen.

Petr is a lawfully resident alien, married to a
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer -(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual ••• because of
such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; :-..
-

42

u.s.c.

§ 2000e-2 (a).

The EEOC has promulgated a regulation

providings
Because discrimination on the basis of
citizenship has the effect of discriminating
on the basis of national origin, a lawfully
immigrated alien who is domiciled or residing
in the country may not be discriminated against
on the basis of his citizenship, except •••
[when a statute or Executive order establishes
requirements in the interests of natiQnal security].
29 C.F.R. §l606.1(d) as quoted in petn at 2.
b. Court below: CA 5 accepted the finding of the

----

dist ct that there was "no discrimination on the basis of
~---------------------ancestry or ethnic . backgz:.aund" in the employment practices of

-------

-

resp.

CA 5 felt the words of .the statute were sufficiently
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.-

'

.

-

plain (speaking of "national origin" and not "citizenship")
that no resort to legislative history was required, but
the court looked at history anyway.

It found no evidence

that Congress intended to protect non-citizens.

CA 5

felt the EEOC regulation could not be used to show intent . here,
even though this Court had used an EEOC regulation to show
intent in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401

u.s.

424, 434 (1971).

.

CA 5 noted that no constitutional attack was made; the court
added that the absence of state action would make a Fourteenth
Amendment attack ineffective in any event.
3. a. Petr's contentionsz Petr argues that theCA 5
interpretation is unduly narrow because discrimination
on the basis of citizenship is the type of discrimination
that Title VII was intended to prevent.

Petr argues the

CA 5 opinion will undermine the objectives of the statute
by depriving aliens who most need help the opportunity to
work while allowing immigrants who are established to claim
protection.

Petr stresses that the CA 5 interpretation rejects

the official EEOC position.
Petr claims that this is "national origin plus"
discrimination.

The Court rejected "sex plus" (women with

pre-school children) discrimination in Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 400

u.s.

542 (1971).

Petr argues this

variation on the theme should not be allowed.
Petr cites Graham v. Richardson, 403

u.s.

365, 372

(1971, per Justice Blackmun, Justice Harlan concurring in
part) for the proposition that classifications based on

- 4 -

alienage are suspect under the Equal Protection Clause.
Although petr recognizes that Equal Protection cases have
no immediate bearing on a statutory issue, petr seeks to
invoke the spirit of the "suspect classification" doctrine

______________________________

,
as an aid to statutory
construction.
Finally, petr suggests that the CA 5 interpretation
conflicts with congressional policy, expressed in the immigration
laws, that employment of aliens should be encouraged.
b. Resp's argument: Resp reiterates that petr was
not discriminated against because of her Mexican origin or
her Spanish surname.

Some 98.5% of the individuals employed

in the position sought by Espinoza were of Mexican origin.
Resp interprets the EEOC guideline as an overbroad attempt
to prohibit the use of discrimination against noncitizens as
a subterfuge for discrimination against certain nationalities.
Resp agrees with that objective but argues it has nothing
to do with this case.
Resp contends that Phillips v. Martin

~·1arietta

Corp. dealt with refusal to hire women with pre-school
children even though men with pre-school children were
hired.

There all people with pre-school children were

not treated e qually. Here resp argues that discrimination
is on the basis of citizenship alone; national origin is
not relevant.
Resp argues the CA 5 decision is consistent with
Civil Service regulations that allow only citizens to take
i

·"'

competitive examinations, even though discrimination on the
basis of national origin is prohibited in Civil Service.
Resp argues that the "suspect classification"
concept is a~ailable only "when th~ Court has freedom under the

- 5 (

Fourteenth Amendment to engage in broad construction.
Resp contends the Court has recognized in Graham a
difference between "alienage" (citizenship) and "nationality,"
and this difference cannot be ignored when Congress prohibits
discrimination on the basis of one of these characteristics
but not on the basis of the other.
4. Discussion: This issue is important and difficult.
This case would be a good vehicle because the facts are
undisputed and the employer does not appear to be using
citizenship discrimination as a substitute for nationality
discrimination.

Any expansion of 42

u.s.c. §

2000e-2 will

have far-reaching effects, and the Court might wish to
rallow more lower courts to consider the issue before this
Court examines the problem.

Numerou s federal agencies will

-------- _

be affected if cert is granted, and the views of the Solicitor

,...., be__..~:-:;--:-;;-.;----:-::
General mignt
helpful a! :some stage in the decision-making
process.
There is a response.
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No. 72-671 Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co.
Summer Memorandum
This is a brief memorandum, dictated after having read most of
the briefs. It is entirely preliminary and, in large degree superficial.
Further study is indicated.
Statement of Case
This case involves Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, making
it unlawful for an employer:
"To fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual . . .
because of such individual's national ori in". 42 U.S.C. §2000 (e)2 (a)(l).
Petitioner, a lawfully admitted resident alien (Mexican) living in San Antonio
was refused employment by Farah Manufacturing Company solely because she
was not a U.S. citizen. The EEOC Regional Director found, and it is conceded,

---

that Petitioner was not denied employment because she is S anish or Mexican .
.__

-

~

The district judge found that "persons of Mexican ancestry make up more than
92% of Respondent's total employees, 9 6% of its San Antonio employees, and
97% of the people doing the work for ~~hich Petitioner applied". The district
judge concluded that there was no discrimination on the basis of ancestry or
ethnic background. Respondent had a policy of not employing aliens on account

·- ---

------------- ---

of "security reasons", and accordingly Petitioner was not employed solely
because she was not a citizen.

Reversing the district court, CA 5 unanimously held that Title VII does

2.

not apply to aliens. The term "national origin" was held to mean "exactly
and ownly that". It concluded that the words "national origin" are clear
and unambiguous; that it was unnecessary, therefore, to consider legislative
history; but that the limited legislative history on this point "is completely
consistent" with the ordinary and normal import of the words (Appendix 4-A).
There is an EEOC regulation (Appendix 6-A) which appears to lay down
a flat rule against "discrimination on the basis of citizenship". CA 5 construed
this as applying only to "discrimination" on account of national origin, and
refused to follow the regulation if it was intended to create a per se rule
broadening the scope of the Act.
Under the policy consistently followed by Respondent in this case,
f

no alien - English, Canadian or whatever country, color or race - would

j

have been employed.
New Issue
In its brief filed in this Court, Petitioner raises for the first time
a new issue. She relies on

§

1981 of the Civi:!__lligbts Act aU870 for

---

a~

elaborate argument that it bans private employment discrimination based on

-

-......._

alienage (See Petitioner's brief, 2 6-3 6).

·------.

-

--

Petitioner's brief is ambivalent on this new issue. In stating the
"question presented", Petitioner frames - as the only question presented whether there has been a violation of Title VII. But in her brief, Petitioner
relies on

§

1981 "as an alternative legal ground for reversing the court below",

'

.

3.

arguing that § 1981 applies to private employment discrimination, protects
aliens , and that Title VII should be interpreted to protect those employment
rights protected by §1981.

If we do not agree that Title VII should be so

int<erpreted, Petitioner nevertheless contends that § 1981 provides an
alternative basis for relief.
Question Presented
Unless we wish to examine the new issue raised for the first time on
this appeal, the sole question is that presented to and considered by the courts
below, namely, whether the term "national origin" .in Title VII includes
"citizenship".
Discussion
On the basis of the ordinary meaning of the term itself, and the
summary analysis of CA 5, it is reasonably clear to me that the case was
correctly decided below and should be affirmed.
If, however, we are to consider Petitioner's §1981 argument, we

have something of a new "ballgame". Although I have not analyzed either
the history or the language of that Section with any degree of care - and
certainly not to the point of feeling confident as to an answer - it may well
be possible based on the words alone to reach the result desired by Petitioner.
The Civil Rights Act is notoriously open-ended, susceptible of the same sort
of interpretation as some of the more general provisions of the Constitution itself.

4.

If, as I tentatively believe, the language of §1981 is not free from

ambiguity, the legislative history and its interpretation by the courts becomes
important. I will not undertake in this memorandum to give even a summary
of the contention of the parties with respect to this history. Suffice it to say
that the two briefs are "poles apart". Indeed, it is reasonably clear that
counsel for one of the parties at least has been disingenious in the analysis
of the legislative history because the briefs are irreconcilably divergent.
This is also true - at least - without my having read the cases - in the
treatment by the respective briefs of the authorities.

I am inclined to

accept Respondent's presentation and interpretation of the legislative history.
'". lIt seems more logical on its face and the conditions and purposes which
produce the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Civil Rights Acts
of that era, I would doubt that there was any Congressional intent to proscribe
any private discrimination in employment against aliens.

Respondent's

statements with respect to the cases cited by Petitioner, if accurate, dispose
of all of Petitioner's case authorities except Guerra v. Manchester Terminal
Corp., 350 F. Sup. 529. Respondent states flatly that "every case cited by
Espinoza in support of that argument (private discrimination against aliens),
beginning with Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, involves racial
discrimination" (Respondent's Brief, p. 22, 23).
One final point: even if the Act of 1981 could be interpreted as applying
to private discriminatory action against aliens (as distinguished from state

'

.

5.

discriminatory action), there is the further question whether Title VII dealing broadly and explicitly with employment discrimination - has not
superseded or preempted the more general language of

§

1981. Petitioner

i

recognizes the merit of this point, as her brief (p. 36) acknowledges that
"her rights under (1981) may be to some extent dependent upon the interpretation
given Title VII by this Court." Petitioner then states, in the same paragraph,
that "the courts are divided as to the relative priority of that right (under 1981)
and the Title VII right where the two overlap. " (brief, 37).

*****
Tentative View
As presently advised, I am inclined to affirm CA 5. It is to be hoped,
however, that oral argument - and particularly advice from my law clerk {if
he has the opportunity prior to oral argument) - will shed light on the 1981 issue,
if we decide to consider it.
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This is a brief memorandum, dictated after having read most of
the briefs. It is entirely preliminary and, in large degree superficial.
Further study is indicated.
statement of Case
This ca;:.. ~ invclves Title vrr of the Civil Rights Act of 19 64, maki.ng
it unlawful for an employer :
" To fail or refuse to hire . • • any individual . • .
because of such individual's national origin" . 42 U.S. C. §2000 (e) 2(a)(l).
·
Petitioner, a lawfully admitted resident alien (Mexican) living in san Antonio
was refused employment by Farah Manufacturing Company solely because she
was not a U. S. citizen. The EEOC Regional Director found, and it is conceded,
that Petitioner was not denied employment because she is Spanish or Mexican.
The district judge found that "persons of Mexican ancestry make up more than
92% of Respondent's total employees, 96% of its San Antonio employees, and
97% of the people doing the work for W'hich Petitioner applied". The district
judge concluded that there was no discrimination on the basis of ancestry or
ethnic background. Respondent had a policy of not employing aliens on account
of "security reasons", and accordingly Petitioner was not employed solely
because she was not a citizen.
Reversing the district court, CA 5 unanimously held that Title VII does

2.

not apply to aliens. The term "national origin" was held to mean "exactly
and ownly that". It concluded that the words "national origin" are clear
and unambiguous; that it was unnecessary, therefore, to consider legislative
history; but that the limited legislative history on this point "is completely
consistent" with the ordinary and normal import of the words (Appendix 4-A).
There is an EEOC regulation (Appendix 6-A) which appears to lay down
a flat rule against "discrimination on the basis of citizenship". CA 5 construed
this as applying only to "discrimination" on account of national origin, and
refused to follow the regulation if it was intended to create a per se rule
broadening the scope of the :2\ct.
Under the policy consistently followed by Respondent in this case,
~alien-

English, Canadian or whatever country, color or race -would

have been employed.
New Issue
In its brief filed in this Court, Petitioner raises for the first time
a new issue. She relies on

§

1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870 for an

elaborate argument that it bans private employment discrimination based on
alienage (See Petitioner's brief, 2 6-3 6) .
Petitioner's brief is ambivalent on this new issue. In stating the
"question presented" , Petitioner frames - as the only question presented whether there has been a violation of Title VII. But in her brief, Petitioner
relies on

§

1981 "as an alternative legal ground for reversing the court below",

3.

arguing that

§

1981 applies to private employment discrimination, protects

aliens , and that Title VII should be interpreted to protect those employment
r ights protected by §1981.

H we do not agree that Title VII should be so

interpreted , Petitioner nevertheless contends that

§

1981 provides an

alternative basis for relief.
Question Presented
Unless we wish to examine the new issue raised for the first time on
this appeal, the sole question is that presented to and considered by the courts
below, namely, whether the term "national origin" jn Title VII includes
"citizenship" .
Discussion
On the basis of the or dinary meaning of the term itself, and the
summary analysis of CA 5, it is reasonably clear to me that the case was
correctly decided below and should be affirmed.
H, however, we are to consider Petitioner's §1981 argument, we

have something of a new "ballgame". Although I have not analyzed either
the history or the language of that Section with any degree of care -and
certainly not to the point of feeling confident as to an answer - it may

wel~l

be possible based on the wo:rds alone to reach the result desired by Petii.im.1er.

The Civil Rights .Act is notol\iously open-ended, susceptible of the same sort
of

interpretat~on

as eome of the more general provisions of the Constitution itself.

4.

If, as I tentatively believe, the language of §1981 is not free from

ambiguity, the legislative history and its interpretation by the courts becomes
important. I will not undertake in this memorandum to give even a summary
of the contention of the parties with respect to this history. Suffice it to say
that the two briefs are "poles apart". Indeed, it is reasonably clear that
counsel for one of the parties at least has been disingenious in the analysis
of the legislative history because the briefs are irreconcilably divergent.
This is also true - at least - without my having read the cases - in the
treatment by the respective briefs of the authorities.

I am inclined to

accept Respondent's presentation and interpretation of the legislative history.
•· . It seems more logical on its face and the conditions and purposes which

produce the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Civil Rights Acts
of that era, I would doubt that there was any Congressional intent to proscribe
any private discrimination in employment against aliens.

Respondent's

statements with respect to the cases cited by Petitioner, if accurate, dispose
of all of Petitioner's case authorities except Guerra v. Manchester Terminal
Corp., 350 F. Sup. 529. Respondent states flatly that "every case cited by
Espinoza in support of that argument (private discrimination against aliens),
beginning with Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, involves racial
discriminatiov." (A1espondent's Brief, p. 22, 23).
One final point: even if the Act of 1981 could be interpreted as applying
to private discriminatory action against aliens (as distinguished from state

5.

discriminatory action), the r e is the further question whether Title VIIdealing broadly and explicitly with employment discrimination - has not
superseded or preempted the more general language of

§

1981. Petitioner

recognizes the merit of this point, as her brief (p. 36) acknowledges that
"her rights under (1981) may be to some extent dependent upon the interpretation
given Title VII by this Court.'' Petitioner then states, in the same paragraph,
''that "the courts are divided as to the relative priority of that right (under 1981)
and the Title VII right where the two overlap." (brief, 37).

*****
!l'ehy.itive View
As presently advised, I am inclined to affirm CA 5. It i.s to be hoped,
however, that oral argument -and particularly advice from my law clerk -{if
he has the opportunity prior to oral argument) -will shed light on the 1981 issue,
if we decide to consider it.

To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: John Buckley
Re: Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co.Inc., No. 72-671

I think that the CA 5 opinion should be affirmed. My
reasons for reaching this result are precisely those articulated

------

nclusion

does not encompass citizenship. The

of aliens, but it would do violence to the English language

--------- --

to twist the meaning of "national origin" to inc lude aliens.
~---------- ------------------------------~
As
to the 1981 issue, I do not think that the
question is properly before this Court. Resp asserts that the
issue is raised here for the first time, and thts appears to
--1~QQsce~r~t~llto,n~------------be correct. !OntH)'\tk!l should, of course, be discussed during

~

oral argument, but I suspect that petr never briefed the

fl

issue when he was before the Fifth Circuit. If the merits
are reached, I am inclined toward the view that section 1883
does not cover the case at bar. I have not done extensive
research on this issue because I think that

it

_.. is not properly before this Court.
Please excuse the brev1·ty of th·1s memo, but I do not
think the case presents much difficulty. I would have recommended
against granting cert in this case because there is no conflict
in the circuits.
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for the Court in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

J
1

~n;rrtntt•

<q:(mrt of tlF ~ lnit e tt .§tittes
'J.~~as lringtan, ;m. <!f. 20?>12

C H A M BERS O F

Ju s TI CE wM . J . BRE N N A N. J R.

October 29 ,' 1973

I

J

1
I

RE: No. 72-671

Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co.

Dear Thurgood:
I agree.
Sincerely,
)

~l · I'

1
~7L
,
' \.

J(

Mr. Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference

/

.:Stqruuu~

Q}ou.rt o-f tlrt '~ttit.dr
.§mtcll
.

~l«T!rhtgtou. I3.

((}.

20~).!-~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

October 30, 1973

Dear Thurgood:
Re:

No. 72-671 -

Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co.

Please join me.
Since·rely,

lftc.l.
Mr. Justice Marshall

Copies to the Conference

/

.:§Jtttrtntt ~(!ltd trf tqt ~ltittb ;§taft5

._aslrhtgLm. ~. ~· 211&1'~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

October 30, 1973

Re:

No. 72-671 - Espinoza v. Farah

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me in your opinion for the Court.

Sincerely~

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

-.

-

lfp/ss 10/30/73

No. 72-671 Epinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., fuc.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL concurring in the result.
Although I concur in the result and much of the Court's opinion,
I am not in accord with the unnecessary excursion into the validity and
meaning of the guideline of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which provides:
(copy p. 6 of Marshall's opinion)
Mter stating that there is no occasion in this case to "question the

~~~
general validity of this guideline", the Court - a.ftsl' spsmdat ing as

4~J~uL~
1\to varioos

po~sibls

~~

situations i\ concluded:

(copy p. 7 of Marshall's opinion)
It seems to me that this conclusion even if it were relevant
)

to a decision of this case, cannot be supported.

The Court's opinion

·~
~
is iffi~~
8:\fl\od until it commences to address the
1\

TZu=~~·~£~
• st~/
C
that "the plain
A

1\

the result reached by the Court of

EEOC guideline.

language of the statute supports

Appeals ~ '(~ p

2)

*

*Section 703 of Title VII, 42 USC § 2000e -2( a)( 1) makes it "an unlawful
employment practice . . . for an employer to fail or refuse to hire . . .
any individ.J. al . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex ,or national origin".

,. .,.

.

~

2.
And, after reviewing the legislative history and the consistent action
of Congress with respect to federal employment, the Court GOPPe&Uy
concludes:
"To interpret the term 1 national origin 1 to embrace
citizenship requirements would require us to conclude
that Congress itself has repeatedly flaunted its own
declaration of policy. " Supra, p. 4.
It is impossible for me to reconcile the language of § 703,

as correctly interpreted by the Court, with the language of the EEOC
guideline. The latter states categorically, as a fact, that "discrimination
on the basis of citizenship has the effect of discrimination on the basis
of national origin. . .

" With all respect, it seems to me that the

language of the Court quoted above is irreconcilable with the guideline
which the Court then goes on, a few pages later in its opinion,( supra p.
to conclude that the "guideline may be validly applied ilx to a wide
range of situations. . .

II

I am inclined to think that the guideline, contradicting as it
does the statute and being incompatible with established f ongressional
policy as well as the previous position of the Commission itself,

~

~

........
.

'

is facially invalid.

3.

But we need not address this issue in the present

case, it would have been quite sufficient for the Court to have said
merely (as indeed it did at another place in the opinion) that "application
of the guidelinej would be inconsistent with an obvious congressional
intent
:icd:B:Id not to reach the employment practice in question. "(supra, p 8.)*
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*I agree with the Court ther may indeed be situations where an
employer professes to deny e ployment on the 1Dx:isx> basis of
citizenship when in fact there i an intent to discriminate on the
basis of national origin. As the ourt correctly said, "a citizenship
requirement might be but one pa of a wider scheme of unlawful
national origin discrimination" (su ra, p. 6). But such unlawful
conduct, determined in each case 1:J a factual scrutiny, would be a
circumvention of the statute itself. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 u.s. 424, 431 (1971).
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
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Although I concur in a the result
I am not in(accord with
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about the guideline f(. the Equal Employment ,portunity

t

Commission.
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The Court recognizes that the guideline! is inapplicable to this
case, but states that it "may be validly applied to a wide range of
situations . . . .

"~

As I read today's

opinion, ~

I

didmu wi+L

~~~~~~ w~e-by-case
f

d .e+.t VY'MYI a fi;M

:i:lweeUgatiun of

whether ~

"discrimination on the basis of citizenship

has the effect of discrimination on the basis of national origin". I
would~

agree, of course, that there may be situations where

an employer professes to deny employment on the basis of citizenship
when in fact there is an intent to discriminate on the basis of national
origin.

As the Court

s~~~

correctly~'

"a citizenship requirement might

be but one part of a wider scheme of unlawful national origin

&+.e..J

at (p.,

discrimination." ~ But such unlawful conduct, determined

. ( ;.J.sR/.f )

vu::Jlo..~

1

where appropriate by a factual scrutiny, would {be a c.D e
the

statut~.itseti.

(1971).

2.

j_

'"to cation of

"

See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 431

Recourse to the guideline, even if valid, would be

11

~

\

~unnecessary.
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Altlroagh unnecessat y to dee ide in this

e~

the guideline is
I
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facially invalid~ c-onfliutit:fg with the language of § 703.

The relevant

language of the guideline is as follows:
"Because discrimination on the basis of citizenship has
the effect of discrimination on the basis of national
origin, a lawfully immigrated alien/ who is domiciled
or residing in this country may not be discriminated
against on the basis of his citizenship. . . . " 29
CFR § 1606. 1(d) (1972).
The Court's opinion CQP.otly holds that "to interpret the

~k~hn-y]
Aterm 'national origin' to embrace citizenship requirements would

.floo
require us to conclude that Congress itself has repeatedly
its own declaration of policy. "
It semns:=W

m8
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---------------~
guideline explicitly does exactly what

t~ fh~
rl(\o

the Court said would
•

"~unt"

congressional policy: It "interpret[s]

the term national origin to embrace" citizenship; and it states,

without qualification, that where there is discrimination on the basis
of qtizienship [as conceded in this case] this is the equivalent of

~

3.

LA.--'

discrimination on the basis of national origin and it6 therefore invalid.

1/

I do not see:tkR how the Court's interpretation of the

statute ~ wh::feh

nss_m can be reconciled with its conclusion that the guideline "may
J1,

be validly applied to a wide range of situations".
no room for investigation of the facts.

The guidline leaves
/\

It enunciates a per

~rule

that

that "discrimination on the basis of citizenship" is the same as
"discrimination on the basis of national origin".

This is precisely

the oppositexwm of what the Court holds in this case, it is contrary to
~

the legislative history of

§

703 and to establish congressional policy
A

with respect to federal employmen) and also is incompatible with the
previous position of the Commission itself.
The effect of the Court's dictum [that the "guideline may be validly
applied in a wide range of situations"], conflicting as I think it does

~
w ith the

Court' ~ holding

as to the meaning of the statute, can only

lead to confusion and misunderstanding.
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
Although I concur in the result and most of the Court's opinion,
I am not in accord with what is said, in large part unnecessarily, about
the guideline issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
See 29 CFR § 1606. l(d) (1972).
The Commission's guideline provides, in pertinent part:
"Because discrimination on the basis of citizenship
has the effect of discrimination on the basis of national
origin, a lawfully immigrated alien who is domiciled
or residing in this country may not be discriminated
against on the basis of his citizenship . . . . " 29
CFR § 1606.l(d) (1972).
The Court recognizes that the guideline's basic premise --that
discrimination on the basis of citizenship has the effect of discrimination
on the basis of national origin -- is unsupported by the facts of the present
case. Nevertheless, the Court states that the guideline "may be validly
applied to a wide range of situations." Ante, at 7 .

This cone lusion

apparently rests on the Court's construction of the guideline as requiring
a case-by-case determination of whether "discrimination on the basis of
citizenship has the effect of discrimination on the basis of national origin."

2.
As I read the Commission's guideline, however, it leaves no room
for factual inquiry. It enunciates a per se rule that "discrimination on the
basis of citizenship" is equivalent to "discrimination on the basis of national
origin" and therefore expressly proscribes discrimination on the basis of
citizenship. As the Court correctly holds, "to interpret the [ statutoryl
term 'national origin' to embrace citizenship requirements would require us
to conclude that Congress itself has repeatedly flouted its own declaration
of policy." Ante, at 4. Yet the guideline accomplishes exactly that result.
It "interpret[ s] the term national origin to embrace citizenship" by

~L<...- /.-1..-L_ -1~ ..cjc~· A- fl •. . J ?{,-v;_,_ i2l d!.c.JL, t ~, "'A_kl)fl.
automatically equating discrimination on the basis of national origin. This

result is contrary to the Court's major holding, to the language and
legislative history of

§

703 of Title VII, 42 U.S. C.

§

2000e-2(a)(l), to

the established Congressional policy with respect to federal employment,
and to the previous position of the Commission. In these circumstances,
the guideline would appear to be invalid on its face.
But even if the guideline were interpreted as requiring only a
case-by-case determination of whether discrimination on the basis of
citizenship had the effect of discrimination on the basis of national origin,

.. .

3.

it would be maBih ntly superfluous. There

rna~ ~

of course J many

situations in which an employer professes to deny employment on the
basis of citizenship when in fact there is an intent to discriminate on the
basis of national origin. As the Court notes, "a citizenship requirement
might be but one part of a wider scheme of unlawful national origin
discrimination." Ante, at 6.

But such unlawful conduct, determined

where appropriate by factual scrutiny, would itself be a violation of the
statute. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) .
.>I-.

Recourse to the guidline, even if valid, would be wholly unnecessary.
~

The Court's dictum --that the "guideline may be validly applied
\\

to a wide range of situations -- appears to conflict with the Court's

~t

holding as to the meaning of the statute and invites relitigation of the
issue we face today.
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[November -, 1973]
Mn. JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the opmwn of the
Court.

This case involves interpretation of the phrase "national origin" in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Petitioner Cecilia Espinoza is a lawfully admitted
resident alien who was born in and remains a citizen
of Mexico. She resides in San Antonio, Texas, with her
husband, Rudolfo Espinoza, a United States citizen. In
July, 1969, Mrs. Espinoza sought employment as a scamstress at the San Antonio division of respondent Farah
Manufacturing Company. Her employment application
was rejected on the basis of a long-standing company
policy against the employment of aliens. After exhausting their administrative remedies with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1 petitioners commenced
this suit in the District Court alleging that respondent had
discriminated against Mrs. Espinoza because of her "national origin" in violation of § 703 of Title VII, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e-2 (a)(1). The District Court granted petitioners' motion for summary judgment, holding that a
refusal to hire because of lack of citizenship constitutes
Section 706 (e), 42 U.S. C. § 2000c-5 (c).
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discrimination on the basis of "national origin." 343 F.
Supp. 1205. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding
that the statutory phrase "national origin" did not embrace citizenship. 462 F. 2d 1331. We granted the writ
to resolve this question of statutory construction, - U. S. - , and now affirm.
Section 703 makes it "an unlawful employment practice . . . for an employer to fail or refuse to hire ...
any individual . . . because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." Certainly the
plain language of the statute supports the result reached
by the Court of Appeals. The term "national origin"
on its face refers to the country where a person was
born. or, more broadly. the country from which his or
her ancestors camc. 2
2

Minne~tota State Art Agnin~t Disf'rimination, 1\rJNN.
363.01, Suhd. 6 (HJ71), defining "national origin" as "the phre
of birth of an incliYiclunl or an~· of his linen! :tncrstor~."
Sewral States hn1·r s tatutr~ m:tking; it illr.e::tl to diH·rimin:ttr on
thr hn~i~ of nation:tl origin. :tnrl m:m~· of the'r ~tatutes !t:nr :tpparently been interpreted bY the appropriatr state enforcement :1genry
ns not barring; citizm~hip re(Juiremrnt,-. For Pxampl<'. th<' New
York Human Rights T.aw provides that it. is :m nnl:twfnl diRrriminn.tory practice to rcJusr to hire an~· .i ndi,·iclunl becnn~c of his or her
origin and ndditionnll~· provides that. it sh:tll be unbwful for :m
employer to make m1~· pre-employment in(Juiry "whirh Pxprrsses
directly or indirertl~·. nn~· limitation, sperifiration or di"crimin:1tion
as to . . . national origin . . . . " N. Y. ExECUTTI'E LAw § 29G
(l\1r Kinney 1972). The N rw York Stnie Commis~ion Again~t Discriminn,tion has rulrd t h:tt :111 (•tnplon·r ma~· lawfully n~l' n .ioh applicant whether he or Rhe is n citizen of tilP United St:ttr~. Sec 3
CCH EMPLOYli[ENT PnAC1'. Gmm.: ,I 26,051. at 8899.
While th<'~C interpretntiom of stn.tP statutp~ do not control our
construction of feclcr!ll law, we think them indie::tti\·e of a general
understanding that tlw trrm "nn,tionnl origin" cloPs not. rrnhmce a
requirement of Unitrcl Sta.te~ citizenship.

See, e. g..

STAT.
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The statute's legislative history, though quite meager
in this respect, fully supports this construction. The
only direct definition given the phrase "national origin''
is the following remark made on the floor of the House
of Representatives by Congressman Roosevelt, Chairman of the House Subconunittee \Yhich reported tlw
bill: "It means the country from which you or your
forebears come from. You may come from Poland ,
Czechoslovakia, England, France, or any other country."
110 Cong. Rec. 2548-49 (1964). We also note that an
carlier yersion of ~ 703 had referred to discrimination
because of "race, color, religion , national origin , or ancestry." H. R. 715~. 88th Cong., 1st Scss .. ~ 804, Oct. 2,
1963 (Comm. print) (emphasis acldrd). The deletion
of the \\·ord "ancestry" from the final Ycrsion was not
intended as a matrrial change, see H. R. Rep. Ko. 914r
88th Cong .. 1st Sess. (1963) , at 87, suggesting that th e
terms "national origin" and "ancestry" were considered
synonymous.
There arc other compelling reason s to believe that
Congress did not intend the term "national origin" to
embrace citizenship requirements. Rince HH4, the Federal Government itself, through Civil Service Commission regulations, has engaged in what amounts to discrimination against aliens by denying them the right to·
rnter competitive examination for federal em11loyment.
Executive Order No. 1997 (HH4); sec 5 U. S. C. § 3301;
5 CFR. § 388.101 (1972). But it has never been suggested that the citizenship requirement for federal employment constitutes discrimination because of national
origin, even though since 1943, various executive orders
have expressly prohibited discrimination on the basis
of national origin in federal government employment.
See. c. g., Exec. Order 9346, 8 Feel. Reg. 7183 ( 1943);
Exec. Order 11478, 34 F eel. Reg. 12985 (1969).
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Moreover, § 701 (b) of Tit. VII, in language closely
parallelling § 703, makes it "the policy of the United
States to insure equal employment opportunities for
Federal employees without discrimination because of ...
national origin .... " Civil Rights Act of 1964, P. L.
88-352, § 701 (b), 78 Stat. 254, reenacted, P. L. 89-554,
80 Stat. 523 (1966), 5 U. S. C. 7151. The legislative
history of that section reveals no mention of any intent
on Congress' part to reverse the long-standing practice
of requiring federal employees to be United States citizens. To the contrary, there is every indication that no
such reversal was intended. Congress itself has on several occasions since 1964 enacted statutes barring aliens
from federal employment. The Treasury, Postal Service, and General Appropriation Act of 1973, for example,
provides that "no part of any appropriation contained in
this or any other Act shall be used to pay compensation
of any officer or employee of Government of the United
States ... unless such person is a citizen of the United
States." a P. L. 92-351, § 602, 86 Stat. 471 ( 1972). See
also P. L. 91-144, § 502, 83 Stat. 336-337 ( 1970); P. L.
91--439, § 502, 84 Stat. 902 ( 1970).
To interpret the term "national origin" to embrace
citizenship requirements would require us to conclude
that Congress itself has repeatedly flouted its own
declaration of policy. This Court cannot lightly find
Petitioners argue that it is unreasonable to attribute an~· great
significance to these provisions in determining Congressional intent
because the barrier to employment of noncitizens has been tucked
away in appropriations bills rather than expressed in a more affirmative fashion. We disagree. Indeed, the fact that Congress has
occasionally enacted exception~ to the gener11l barriN indicates to
us that Congress was well aware of what it was doing. Sec, e. g.,
P. L. 92-204, § 703, 85 Stat. 726 (1971) (Department of Defense);
P. L. 91-382, 84 Stat. 823 (1970) (Library of Congress).
3
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such a breach of faith. See Bate Refrigerator Co. v_
Sulzberger, 157 U. S. 1, 38 (1895). So far as federal
employment is concerned, we think it plain that Congress has assumed that the ban on national origin discrimination in § 701 (b) did not effect the historical
practice of requiring citizenship as a condition of employment. See First National Bank v. Missouri, 263
U. S. 640, 658 ( 1924). And there is no reason to believe
Congress intended the term "national origin" in § 703
to have any broader scope. Cf. King v. Smith, 392 U. S.
309, 330-331 (1968).
Petitioners have suggested that the statutes and regulations discriminating against noncitizens in federal employment are unconstitutional under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We need not address
that question here/ for the issue presented in this case
is not whether Congress has the power to discriminate
against aliens in federal employment, but rather, whether
Congress intended to prohibit such discrimination in
private employment. Suffice it to say that we cannot
conclude Congress would at once continue the practice
of requiring citizenship as a condition of federal employment and, at the same time, prevent private employersfrom doing likewise. Interpreting § 703 as petitioners
suggest would achieve the rather bizzare result of preventing Farah from insisting on United States citizenship as a condition of employment while the very agency
charged with enforcement of Tit. VII would itself be
required by Congress to place such a condition on its
own personnel.
4 We left this question undecided in Sugarman v. Dougall, U. S. - , - n. 12 (1973). Sec Jalil v. Ilampton, 148 U. S. App.
D. C. 415, 460 F. 2d 923, ccrt. denied, 409 U. S. 887 (1972); MotiF
Sun Wong v. Hampton, 333 F. Supp. 527 (N. D. Cal. 1971).
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The District Court drew primary support for its holding from an interpretative guideline issued by the Equal
Employment oppo;:-tunity Commission, which provides:
"Because discrimination on the basis of citizenship
has the effect of discrimination on the basis of
national origin, a lawfully immigrated alien who
is domiciled or residing in this country may not be
discriminated against on the basis of his citizC'nship . . . . " 29 CFR § 1606.1 (d) (1972).
Like the Court of Appeals. we have no occasion lwrc to
question the general validity of this guideline insofar as it can be read as an expression of the Commission's belief that there may be many situations
where discrimination on the basis of citizenship would
have the effect of discriminating on the basis of
national origin. In some iustances, for example, a citizenship requirement might be but one part of a \\·icl0r
scheme of unlawful national origin discrimination. In
other cases, an employer might usc a citiz0nship test as
a pretext to disguise what is in fact national origin
discrimination. C0rtainly Tit. VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of citizenship whenever it has tho
purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin. "The Act proscribes not only ov<'rt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation." Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
It is equally clear, however, that these principles lend
no support to petitioners in this case. There is no inchcation in the record that Farah's policy against employmont of aliens had the purpose or eff<'ct of discriminating
against persons of Mexican national origin.r, It is con"There i;; no ~nggr.-;tion. for rx:Hnplr, that thr compnny rrfu~ed
to hire aliens of l\lrxicnn or SpaniRIHprnking b~1ck~~:ronncl while
hiring tho"e of othrr nationnl origin~. Rt•Rpondrnt'~ prr~ident

1:2-611-01'1:\10:\

E:-;PEOZA v. f .\JL\ll ::\TFG. CO.

7

ceded that Farah accepts employees of Mexican origin,
provided the in eli vidual concerned has become an American citizen. Indeed, the District Court found that persons of :Mexican ancestry make up more than 96o/o of
the employees at the company's San Antonio division,
aJHl 977c of those doing the \York for which Mrs. Espinoza
applied. While statistics such as these do not automatically shield an employer from a charge of unlawful
discrimination, the plain fact of the matter is that Farah
docs not discriminate against persons of Mexican national
origin \\'ith respect to employment in the job Mrs. Espinoza
sought. She was denied employment not because of the
country of her origin, but because she had not yet
achieved United States citizenship. In fact the record
shows that the worker hired in place of Mrs. Espinoza
was a citizen who was Spanish surnamed.
The Commission's guideline may have significance for
a wide range of situations, but not for a case such as
this whore its very premise-that discrimination on the
basis of citizenship has the effect of discrimination on
the basis of national origin-is not borne out. 6 It is
info rnl<'d t hr EEOC'~ Tie~~:ional Dirrrtor im·r~t ip;n t ing the rh :up;c·
tha t. onre in it;; hif'tor~· thr rompan~· had mndr a ~inp;le exrrption
to its polir~' ap;ain~t hiring nlirns, but thr nat ionalitr of the indiYi.dual conrernrd is not rrnaled in the rrcord. ·while the rompany
asks job npplirnnt s whrtbrr they nrr United States C'itizens, it make.;;
no inquiry as to their national origin.
6 It is suggested that a refu~nl to hire an alien always cli;.;adv:mtages that. person ber:lll~e or the rount I'~' of his hirth. A person
horn in thr United Statr~. the aq2;11mrnt ~~:or~. nutomnticallY obtain~
cit izcnship n t hi rth. whilr t ho~r bam rlscwhrre cnn arquire citizen~ hip only through a long and somct imrs diflicult proc·c~::;. See S
U . S. C. §§ 1427 (u) , l.J.:30, 142:3 (1), and 142:3 (2). Thr anHwer to
this nrgumcnt. is that it is not the cmployrr who places the burdens
of na.turalizat ion on tho::;e horn outside the country, but Congress
itself, through laws enactrd pur::;uant to its ronstitutional power
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also significant to note that the Commission itself once
held a different view as to the meaning of the phrase
"national origin." When first confronted with the question, the Commission, through its General Counsel, said:
"'National origin' refers to the country from which the
individual or his forbears came ... , not to whether or
not he is a United States citizen .... " EEOC General
Counsel's Opinion Letter, 1 CCH Employment Practice
Guide~ 1220.20 (1967). 7 The Commission's more recent
interpretation of the statute in the guideline relied on
by the District Court is no doubt entitled to great deference, Griggs v. Duke Power Ca., supra, 401 U. S.,
at 434; Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542,
545 ( 1970) (MARSHALL, J., concurring), but that deference must have limits where, as here, application of
the guideline would be inconsistent with an obvious
congressional intent not to reach the employment practice in question. Courts need not defer to an administrative construction of a statute where there are "compelling indications that it is wrong." Red Lion Broad"To establish an uniform Rule of N::~turalization." U. S. CoNST.,
Art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
Petitioners' reliance on Phillips v. Martin Ma1'ietta Co1'p., 400 U.S.
542 (1971), is misplaced for similar rea~ons. In Phillips wr held it
unbwful under § 703 to have "one hiring policy for womrn
:md nnothrr fnr men . . . . " 400 U. S., at 544. Farah, hmn•vrr,
does not have a different policy for the foreign born than for those
born in the United States. It requires of all that they be citizrns
of the United States.
7 The Opinion Letter was addres~ed to the quest ion whether it
was lawful to discriminatE' against nonrE'sident aliens in favor of
citizens and resident alirns, and exprE'ssly reserved any decision
"regarding discrimination in favor of United States citizens and
against resident aliens." N eyerthele s, the definition of "national
origin" set forth in the Letter is inconsistent with that suggestrd by
petitioners here.
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casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 381 (1969); see
also Zuber v. Allen, 396 U. S. 168, 193 (1969); l'olkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschajt v. FMC, 390 U. S. 261. 272
(1968).
Finally, petitioners seek to draw support from the
fact that Tit. VII protects all individuals from unlaw-·
ful discrimination, whether or not a citizen of the United
States. We agree that aliens are protected from discrimination under the Act. That result may be derived
not only from the use of the term "any individual" in
§ 703, but also as a negative inference from the exemption in § 702, which provides that Tit. VII "shall
not apply to an employer with respect to the employment
of aliens outside any State .... " 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-1.
Title VII was clearly intended to apply with respect to
the employment of aliens inside any State. 8
The question posed in the present case, however, is
not whether aliens are protected from illegal discrimination under the Act, but what kinds of discrimination
the Act makes illegal. Certainly it would be unlawful
for an employer to discriminate against aliens because
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin-for example, by hiring aliens of Anglo-Saxon background but
refusing to hire those of Mexican or Spanish ancestry.
Aliens are protected from illegal discrimination underthe Act, but nothing in the Act makes it illegal to discrimillatc on the basis of citizenship or alienage.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that neither the
8 "Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects all individuals, both citizens and noncitizens, domiciled or residing in the
United States, against discrimination on the basis of race, color,.
religion, sex, or national origin."
29 CFR § 1606.1 (c) (1972).
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language of the Act, nor its history, nor the specific
facts of this case indicate that respondent has engaged
in unlawful discrimination because of national origin. 9
Affirmed.

Petitioners argue that respondent's policy of discriminatingagainst aliens is prohibited by 42 U. S. C. § 1982 which pro\·ides:
"All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every
Stato and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property." This issue was neither raised before the courts below
nor presented in the petition for a writ of certiorari. Accordingly
we express no views thereon.
9
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